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The Contemporary “Fist Inside the Velvet Glove”: 
Employer Captive Audience Meetings 
Under the NLRA 
 
  Paul M. Secunda* 
I.    INTRODUCTION 
One of the more effective anti-union techniques used by employers 
during labor organizational campaigns is the holding during work time of 
employee captive audience meetings.1  Employees, in the midst of deciding 
whether to join a union, are compelled to attend an assembly where man-
agement has a one-way conversation with them about the evils of           
unionism.2  These meetings occur during working hours because the       
employer is then best able to exert its economic authority over employees 
and to play on fears of job loss if employees vote for the union.3    
                                                                                                                           
 * Paul M. Secunda is an Associate Professor of Law at Marquette University Law School.  The 
title of this paper borrows from the famous phrase of Justice Harlan in NLRB v. Exchange Parts Co., 
375 U.S. 405, 409 (1964) (“The danger inherent in well-timed increases in benefits is the suggestion of a 
fist inside the velvet glove. Employees are not likely to miss the inference that the source of benefits 
now conferred is also the source from which future benefits must flow and which may dry up if it is not 
obliged.”).  This contribution to the Florida International University College of Law 2010 Law Review 
Symposium: Whither the Board? The National Labor Relations Board at 75, would not have been 
possible without the exceptional research assistance of Michael Moeschberger, Marquette University 
Law School Class of 2010.  The author claims responsibility for all errors or omissions.  
 1 See William T. Dickens, The Effect of Company Campaigns on Certification Elections: Law 
and Reality Once Again, 36 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 560, 570-71 (1983) (finding that employers’ 
captive audience meetings have statistically significant effects on voting in union certification elec-
tions).   
 2 I think it is purely semantics to say that employees are only compelled to attend these meetings, 
not compelled to listen.  I also believe that the vast majority of these speeches by employers discuss the 
negative consequences of unionism (hence the cottage industry of “union avoidance” consultants), as 
opposed to supplying an even-handed analysis of the advantages and disadvantages of unions. 
 3 The U.S. Supreme Court has long recognized this workplace imbalance of power between 
employer and employee.  See NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 617 (1969) (“Any balancing 
of [Section 8(a)(1) and 8(c)] rights must take into account the economic dependence of the employees 
on their employers, and the necessary tendency of the former, because of that relationship, to pick up 
intended implications of the latter that might be more readily dismissed by a more disinterested ear.”); 
see also NLRB v. United Steelworkers of Am., 357 U.S. 357, 368 (1958) (Warren, C.J., dissenting in 
part and concurring in part) (“Employees during working hours are the classic captive audience.”); Jack 
M. Balkin, Some Realism About Pluralism: Legal Realist Approaches to the First Amendment, 1990 
DUKE L.J. 375, 423 (1990) (“Few audiences are more captive than the average worker.”). 
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While employees are free to leave these meetings in the formal sense, 
they may only do so at the peril of losing their jobs.4  Employees may be 
terminated for refusing to attend anti-union assemblies. Indeed, employees 
can be lawfully terminated for merely asking questions of their employers 
during such a meeting, or for leaving such meetings without permission.5  
One former chairman of the National Labor Relations Board characterized 
this power of an employer to monopolize its workplace for anti-union 
speeches as “an extremely devastating technique in organizational cam-
paigns.”6  It is perhaps no surprise, then, that a recent study indicated that 
employees were subject to nearly eleven captive audience meetings during 
an average union campaign.7  When one also considers that unions          
generally lack access to employer property to disseminate pro-union      
messages,8 one begins to understand the imbalance of this workplace     
dynamic.  What is most amazing to those who hear about the captive      
audience meeting tactics for the first time is that such actions by employers 
are not only tolerated in the United States, but have been permitted under 
the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA or Act)9 for over sixty years.10   
Now ask yourself this: does free speech, whether by an individual or 
corporation, entail the act of compelling someone to listen?11  Is it the same 
                                                                                                                           
 4 See Litton Sys., Inc., 173 N.L.R.B. 1024, 1030 (1968) (indicating that employee has no statuto-
rily protected right to leave a mandatory antiunion captive audience member).  
 5 See NLRB v. Prescott Indus. Prods. Co., 500 F.2d 6, 10-11 (8th Cir. 1974) (refusing to enforce 
an NLRB decision holding that disallowing employee questioning during a captive audience meet-
ing constituted an unfair labor practice); Hicks Ponder Co., 168 N.L.R.B. 806, 815 (1967) (upholding an 
employer’s right to eject vocal pro-union workers who speak out once captive audience meetings have 
begun). 
 6 See William B. Gould IV, Independent Adjudication, Political Process, and the State of Labor-
Management Relations: The Role of the National Labor Relations Board, 82 IND. L.J. 461, 484 (2007). 
 7 See KATE BRONFENBRENNER, UNEASY TERRAIN: THE IMPACT OF CAPITAL MOBILITY ON 
WORKERS, WAGES, AND UNION ORGANIZING 73 (2000), available at 
http://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1002&context=reports. 
 8 See NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 351 U.S. 105, 112 (1956) (employer may prohibit non-
employee union solicitation on its property unless the location of the plant is so remote that the union is 
unable to communicate with employees through its own reasonable efforts); see also Lechmere Inc. v. 
NLRB, 502 U.S. 527, 539 (1992) (holding that the Babcock inaccessibility exception is narrow and 
generally only applies to remote locations such as logging camps, mining camps, and mountain resort 
hotels). 
 9 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (2006). 
 10 See Babcock & Wilcox Co., 77 N.L.R.B. 577 (1948).  To be clear, the statute does not      
expressly authorize captive audience meetings, but Congress decided not to make a legislative statement 
one way or the other on the permissibility of captive audience speech.  That inaction leaves it for the 
Board to decide, based on its experience with the complexities surrounding industrial relations, the 
proper path to take.  See infra Part III. 
 11 The Supreme Court has held clearly not.  See Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703 (2000); Rowan v. 
U.S. Post Office Dep’t., 397 U.S. 728, 738 (1970) (“[N]o one has a right to press even ‘good’ ideas on 
an unwilling recipient.”); Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 537-38 (1945) (finding that employers may 
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when somebody tries to persuade you of their position through speech alone 
as opposed to doing so with an “economic gun” to your head?  Not at all.  
Yet, American labor law treats the employer’s captive audience behavior as 
if its tactics are just a matter of free speech, rather than a form of highly 
effective employer coercive conduct.12 
In a previous article, I advocated for states to fill the void by passing 
minimum work standards legislation to prevent employers from firing    
employees for failing to attend such meetings.13  Although at least one state, 
Oregon, has recently enacted this approach,14 such state legislative enact-
ments are inevitably ensnared in questions concerning NLRA preemption.15  
Rather than negotiate the byzantine maze that is the NLRA preemption doc-
trine, this Article maintains that the same outcome – the outlawing of     
employer captive audience meetings – can be achieved without amendment 
to the current NLRA.  By focusing on the speech/conduct continuum      
recognized in the picketing areas of labor law, and by reemphasizing the 
animating purposes behind the Taft-Hartley Amendments of 1947 (i.e.,   
employee free choice in deciding whether or not to join a union), this type 
of employer tactic can be finally relegated to the dustbin of labor history.   
To those who say that we should heed past National Labor Relations 
Board (NLRB or Board) precedent, I argue that past precedent is only valid 
to the extent that the original Board decision comports with minimum 
standards of reasoned elaboration.  The Board decision in Babcock &    
Wilcox,16 which established the legality of employer captive audience    
meetings in 1948, fails to meet this bare standard.  Consequently, the time is 
well past nigh for its overruling by the present Board.  
                                                                                                                           
have right to persuade their employees, but “[w]hen to this persuasion other things are added which 
bring about coercion, or give it that character, the limit of the [employer’s First Amendment] right has 
been passed”). 
 12 The argument here is not that captive audience meetings are unlawful because they are ubiqui-
tous and highly effective, but rather that they are properly subject to regulation under the current lan-
guage of the NLRA as conduct rather than speech. 
 13 See Paul M. Secunda, Towards the Viability of State-Based Legislation to Address Workplace 
Captive Audience Meetings in the United States, 29 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 209 (2008).  With a group 
of other law professors, I also advocated this view in the recent federal case of Associated Oregon 
Industries v. Avakian.  See Amicus Brief of Law Professors in Support of Defendants’ Opposition to 
Summary Judgment, No. 09CV09-1494 (D. Or. Dec. 12, 2009) (filed Mar. 22, 2010).  The case was 
eventually dismissed in favor of defendants on standing grounds, see Associated Oregon Industries v. 
Avakian, No. 09CV09-1494, 2010 WL 1838661 (D. Or. May 6, 2010), but another substantive 
challenge to this law appears inevitable. 
 14 This captive audience meeting legislation, Senate Bill 519, is codified at Oregon Revised 
Statutes §§ 659.780, 659.785 (2010). 
 15 See generally Henry H. Drummonds, Beyond the Employee Free Choice Act: Unleashing the 
States in Labor-Management Relations Policy, 19 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 83 (2010). 
 16 77 N.L.R.B. 577 (1948). 
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To those who say that employees, once hired, must listen to any 
speech their employer wants them to hear since they are being paid for their 
time, I argue that employees are paid to do certain work, not be compelled 
to listen to ideological speeches by their employers.  Employees, outside of 
their work duties/job descriptions, should be free from being forced to hear 
or do anything that is against their morals, principles, and dignity – this is 
called “human rights.”  Employees should be unmolested by their          
employers in matters of personal conscience and belief, because such con-
cerns involve highly charged and complex issues of personal preference and 
trust.  Instead of permitting this state of workplace affairs to continue, this 
article maintains that the Board should conclude that such captive audience 
meetings are inherently coercive and interfere with employees’ Section 7 
rights to organize, in violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. 
This Article proceeds in three parts.  In the first part, the Article briefly 
provides an overview of the changing status of captive audience meetings 
since the inception of the NLRA.  The second part re-examines the       
Congressional policy that motivated the enactment of the Taft-Hartley 
Amendments in 1947 – employee free choice.  Finally, the third part pro-
poses that the Board overrule past Board precedent and hold that employer 
captive audience conduct is incompatible with employee free choice, may 
be properly regulated under the NLRA as coercive conduct, and should be 
per se banned as an impermissible interference with employee Section 7 
rights.  
II.  A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF THE CHANGING STATUS 
               OF CAPTIVE AUDIENCE MEETINGS 
A. Pre-Taft Hartley Act Practice 
Today, captive audience meetings remain a ubiquitous fixture of     
private employer anti-organization campaigns,17 but this was not always the 
case.  When initially adopted as the Wagner Act of 1935,18 the NLRA failed 
to provide any affirmative protections for employer free speech.  Section 7 
of the Wagner Act provided that workers had the right to organize, to col-
lectively bargain, and to engage in concerted activity for mutual aid and 
protection.19  Employers who interfered, coerced, or restrained employees in 
                                                                                                                           
 17 A recent study revealed that ninety-two percent of the sample’s 400 anti-union campaigns 
included captive audience meetings in the workplace.  BRONFENBRENNER, supra note 7, at 81. 
 18 The National Labor Relations Act of 1935, ch. 372, 49 Stat. 449 (1935). 
 19 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2006). 
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the exercise of their Section 7 rights were liable for unfair labor practices 
under Section 8(1) of the Act.20 
Because the Act remained silent on employer free speech rights, the 
NLRB initially adopted the position that employers were to remain neutral 
during employee organization campaigns.21  For instance, in one of the first 
Board cases, Pennsylvania Greyhound Lines,22 the employer imposed an 
employee association upon its employees in violation of Section 8(2).23  
When employees subsequently attempted to form an independent union, the 
employer responded by adamantly urging its employees not to join.24      
Various supervisors repeatedly questioned employees about union activity, 
threatening termination for any union involvement, and were otherwise 
very outspoken about their hostility toward unions.25  Finding a Section 8(1) 
violation for the employer’s repeated attempts to discourage union in-
volvement, the Board ordered the employer to cease and desist from dis-
couraging union membership.26  The Board was particularly mindful of   
employees’ susceptibility to coercion through employer suggestions,      
stating:  
Such “advice” is not the advice of a person on an equal plane and   
having an unprejudiced mind.  It is the “advice” of an employer who 
has the right to discharge the employee to whom the “advice” is given 
– to control to a large extent his economic position and thus his      
welfare.27 
While Pennsylvania Greyhound Lines did not directly involve captive 
audience meetings, the Board specifically addressed the legality of such 
                                                                                                                           
 20 Id. § 158(a)(1).  The employer interference provisions were initially codified as section 8(1); 
the Taft-Hartley amendments of 1947 recodified these provisions at 8(a)(1), and added the union unfair 
labor practice provisions under Section 8(b). 
 21 See JOHN E. HIGGINS, JR., THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW 94 (5th ed. 2006) (explaining that 
Board under the Wagner Act took the position that any partisan employer involvement would inevitably 
interfere with the Section 7 rights of employees). 
 22 See Pa. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 1 N.L.R.B. 1, 48 (1935).  Company unions such as the       
employee association in Pennsylvania Greyhound were a major impediment to the formation of inde-
pendent labor organizations prior to the enactment of the NLRA.  See Matthew W. Finkin, Representa-
tion of Employees Within the Firm, 54 AM. J. COMP. L. 395, 403 (Supp. 2006) (“The historical intent of 
[Section 8(2)] was to legislate against the creation of sham (or ‘company’) unions that flourished in the 
mid-1930s.”).  As a result, Section 8(2), recodified as Section 8(a)(2) today, made it an unfair labor 
practice for employer to “dominate or interfere with the formation or administration of any labor organi-
zation or contribute financial or other support to it.”  29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(2). 
 23 See Pa. Greyhound, 1 N.L.R.B. at 48. 
 24 Id. at 2. 
 25 Id. at 18-19. 
 26 Id. at 48, 51. 
 27 Id. at 23. 
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meetings in Clark Bros. Co., Inc.28  Upon learning of a run-off election   
between the Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO) union and        
Employee Association, Inc. of Clark Bros. Co. (EAI), the employer sought 
to insure selection of EAI by engaging in an anti-CIO campaign.29  Follow-
ing a five day period that included anti-CIO mailings to employees and 
anti-CIO advertisements in the local newspaper, the employer directed two 
captive audience meetings for all plant employees, the latter only an hour 
before the election.30 
During the second speech, made at the plant during working hours, all 
employees were directed by an announcement over the public address sys-
tem, and others were instructed by their foremen, to convene on the ship-
ping floor with the specific purpose of listening to a speech by the Vice 
President of the company.31  While the Vice-President gave this speech, all 
manufacturing operations were shut down, and the speeches were broadcast 
over the public address system throughout the entire plant.32  Adopting the 
Trial Examiner’s33 conclusion that the employer played on the employees’ 
fear of job insecurity by making it clear that support of the CIO was not in 
the company’s interests,34 the Board found that the speech interfered,      
restrained and coerced employees in violation of Section 8(1).35  The Board 
further adopted a rule that employer captive audience meetings during work 
time amounted to a per se violation of employee Section 7 rights.36  Elabo-
rating on its rule, the Board explained:  
The Board has long recognized that “the rights guaranteed to employ-
ees by the Act include the full freedom to receive aid, advice, and     
information from others, concerning those rights and their enjoy-
ment.”  Such freedom is meaningless, however, unless the employees 
are also free to determine whether or not to receive such aid, advice, 
and information.  To force employees to receive such aid, advice, and 
information impairs that freedom; it is calculated to, and does, inter-
fere with the selection of a representative of the employees’ choice.  
                                                                                                                           
 28 70 N.L.R.B. 802 (1946). 
 29 Id. at 803. 
 30 Id. at 803-04. 
 31 Id. at 820. 
 32 Id. 
 33 The Trial Examiner, today known as an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ), is the first person to 
hear evidence after a complaint is issued in an unfair labor practice case.  The trial examiner makes 
findings of fact and issues a decision and a recommended order.  Such decisions are appealed to the 
NLRB. 
 34 Clark Bros., 70 N.L.R.B. at 820-21. 
 35 Id. at 804. 
 36 Id. at 804-05. 
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And this is so, wholly apart from the fact that the speech itself may be 
privileged under the Constitution.37   
Even at this early point of its history, the Board appeared cognizant of 
the inherent power imbalance between the employer and its employees and 
felt that such a rule against captive audience meetings was necessary to 
insulate employees from employers’ greater economic power.38 
Addressing possible constitutional issues that may have been           
implicated by its rule, the Board noted that alternative channels of commu-
nication existed for the employer to impart its anti-union message to       
employees, specifically in the form of non-mandatory meetings.39  The 
Board thus identified for the first time the inherent duality of captive audi-
ence meetings, separating the speech facet from the conduct of compelling 
attendance at these meetings.  Because the Board found that mandatory 
attendance policy was not necessarily related to the employer’s ability to 
speak, it felt it could freely regulate the coercive aspect of the employer’s 
conduct.40 
B. Captive Audience Meetings Post-Taft Hartley 
Roughly one year after the Board’s Clark Bros. decision, Congress 
passed the Taft-Hartley Act of 1947.41  Believing that the Wagner Act     
unfairly advantaged union interests because it only addressed employee 
rights to organize, only provided for employer unfair labor practices, and 
did not grant employers free speech rights when opposing organizing cam-
paigns, Congress amended the NLRA.42  While leaving the text of the origi-
nal Wagner Act unchanged, the Taft-Hartley amendments provided three 
pertinent additions to the Act:  (1) employees now had the affirmative right 
to refrain from Section 7 activities;43 (2) unions could now be sanctioned for 
                                                                                                                           
 37 Id. at 805 (emphasis in original and internal citations omitted).  Interestingly, even before the 
introduction of the free speech provisions in Section 8(c) of the Taft-Hartley Amendments, the Board 
considered, and rejected, any possible First Amendment problems with its captive audience meeting 
prohibition. 
 38 Id. 
 39 Id. 
 40 Id. 
 41 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-144, 167, 172-187 (2006). 
 42 Congress enacted the Taft-Hartley Amendments over the veto of President Truman. 
 43 29 U.S.C. § 157 (“Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist 
labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage 
in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, 
and shall also have the right to refrain from any or all of such activities except to the extent that such 
right may be affected by an agreement requiring membership in a labor organization as a condition of 
employment as authorized in section 8(a)(3).”) (italicized portion added by Taft-Hartley).  
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committing unfair labor practices;44 and (3) employers expressly enjoyed 
for the first time protection for their non-coercive speech.  As to the last 
addition, new section 8(c) provides: 
The expressing of any views, argument, or opinion, or the dissemina-
tion thereof, whether in written, printed, graphic, or visual form, shall 
not constitute or be evidence of an unfair labor practice under any of 
the provisions of this subchapter, if such expression contains no threat 
of reprisal or force or promise of benefit.45 
While Taft-Hartley granted employers free speech protections, these 
rights were not absolute.  Section 8(c) expressly limits protected speech to 
communications that do not amount to a “threat of reprisal or force or 
promise of benefit.”46  So, for instance, in NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co.,47 the 
Supreme Court held that inferences communicated by an employer that its 
plant would close upon unionization constituted a coercive threat and, 
therefore, were not protected speech under Section 8(c).48  Similarly, the 
Court recognized employees’ heightened vulnerability to coercion in the 
context of employer promises during organizing campaigns in NLRB v.   
Exchange Parts,49 analogizing the promised remuneration to “a fist inside 
the velvet glove.”50  Such implicitly coercive promises were also found not 
to be protected by Section 8(c).  
Although by no means required,51 the Board also quickly adopted a 
new approach to captive audience meetings in a case decided shortly after 
Taft-Hartley’s enactment. In Babcock & Wilcox,52 the Board, in a           
conclusory manner, abandoned its per se rule from Clark Bros. against   
                                                                                                                           
 44 Id. § 158(b) (“It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents . . . “). 
 45 Id. § 158(c).  The U.S. Supreme Court later held that Section 8(c) “merely implements the First 
Amendment.”  NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 617 (1969). 
 46 29 U.S.C. § 158(c). 
 47 395 U.S. 575 (1969). 
 48 Id. at 619-20. 
 49 375 U.S. 405 (1964). 
 50 Id. at 409. 
 51 As will be developed in Part III infra, this approach was not required since the aspect of the 
captive audience meetings sought to be regulated was conduct as opposed to speech.  As also explained 
below, the Board did not discuss at all this essential speech/conduct distinction in its Babcock & Wilcox 
decision.  Former NLRB Chairman William Gould suggests that the shift in doctrine was done “reluc-
tantly.”  Yet, the Board has, as recently as 1998, refused to revisit the doctrine.  Gould, supra note 6, at 
484 n.11 (citing Beverly Enters.-Haw., Inc., 326 N.L.R.B. 335, 361 (1998)). 
 52 77 N.L.R.B. 577 (1948). 
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employer captive audience meetings.53  In doing so, the Board focused on 
the language of Section 8(c) and some unspecified “legislative history.”54  
Yet, as far as the language of Section 8(c), it expressly applies only to 
employer speech, not employer conduct.  In fact, a very instructive analogy 
can be made here between the way the U.S. Supreme Court handles labor 
picketing and how it deals with employer captive audience meetings.  The 
Supreme Court has long recognized the dual nature of labor picketing.55  
Although the Court initially invalidated state laws that broadly banned all 
labor pickets by equating peaceful picketing with pure speech,56 this analy-
sis lasted less than two decades.  The Court soon revised its free-speech 
approach to picketing in Teamsters v. Vogt.57  
Addressing the validity of a state law that enjoined coercive or intimi-
dating pickets, the Vogt Court recognized that, independent of its communi-
cative component, picketing may also involve coercive conduct.58  In this 
regard, Justice Frankfurter for the Court wrote: “Picketing by an organized 
group is more than free speech, since it involves patrol of a particular     
locality and since the very presence of a picket line may induce action of 
one kind or another, quite irrespective of the nature of the ideas which are 
being disseminated.”59  Where the picket was carried out to coerce the    
employer to put pressure on its employees to join the union, the Court held 
that such picketing “certainly involved little, if any, ‘communication.’”60  
Finding therefore that the state statute against coercive picketing furthered a 
legitimate purpose of preventing intimidation, the Court upheld the statue in 
Vogt.61   
Although Vogt deals with constitutional issues under the First 
Amendment, the case provides a robust analogy for assessing the dual    
aspects of captive audience meetings under the NLRA.62  Just as the Clark 
                                                                                                                           
 53 Id. at 578 (“The language of Section 8(c) of the amended Act, and its legislative history, make 
it clear that the doctrine of the Clark Bros. case no longer exists as a basis for finding unfair labor prac-
tices in circumstances such as this record discloses.”) (emphasis added).   
 54 Id. 
 55 See Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, Local 695 v. Vogt, Inc., 354 U.S. 284, 289 (1957). 
 56 See Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 105 (1940).  In this sense, the Court’s prior approach in 
Thornhill to picketing is similar to the Board’s approach in Babcock & Wilcox of seeing captive audi-
ence meetings as being primarily about employer speech. 
 57 354 U.S. 284 (1957). 
 58 Id. at 289. 
 59 Id. 
 60 Id. at 290. 
 61 Id. at 294-95. 
 62 To say the analogy here to picketing is inapt because picketing sometimes involves violence 
largely misses the point: Captive audience meetings are just as effective in deterring employees from 
exercising their free will in an union election as violence on the picket line is in deterring employees 
from supporting the union more generally.  To paraphrase Justice Frankfurter from Vogt: “the very 
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Bros. Board recognized the dual nature of captive audience meetings, the 
Vogt Court acknowledged that, wholly apart from informing the public 
about labor disputes, pickets may also serve to coerce employees,          
employers, or the general public.63  Employer captive audience meetings 
similarly have two components – constitutionally and statutorily protected 
speech and unprotected coercive conduct.  Because the element which the 
Clark Bros. Board sought to regulate with captive audience meeting is the 
compulsion associated with such meetings, the regulation goes only to con-
duct and does not, in any manner, implicate the free speech rights of      
employers.   
So although Section 8(c) explicitly protects employer speech rights to 
disclose views on unionization in a non-coercive manner to its employees, 
the statute does not grant employers the affirmative right to force           
employees to attend meetings in order to hear those views.  Section 8(c) is 
therefore simply inapplicable to the captive audience meeting context     
because employers are still free to espouse their anti-union views to em-
ployees who willfully choose to listen.64  Yet, the Board tells us in Babcock 
& Wilcox that the language of Section 8(c) clearly permits employee cap-
tive audience conduct. No analysis; it just does.65  And because the speech 
                                                                                                                           
presence of a [captive audience meeting] may induce action of one kind or another, quite irrespective of 
the nature of the ideas which are being disseminated.”  Id. at 289.     
 63 Id. at 295. 
 64 Because employees are coerced into hearing the employer’s speech, one could also argue that 
the exceptions to Section 8(c) for “threats of reprisal or force” come into play, serving as another basis 
to make Section 8(c) inapplicable to the captive audience meeting context.  See Alan Story, Employer 
Speech, Union Representation Elections, and the First Amendment, 16 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 
356, 405 (1995) (“[T]he NLRB and the courts overlook and/or permit many election statements and 
interventions by employers which are, in fact, coercive and which have a tendency, as a result, to chill 
the exercise of employee rights of self-organization.”).  Story believes that captive audience speech is a 
paradigmatic example of such unrecognized coercive interventions.  Id. at 422 (“[T]he very exercise of 
an employer’s legally-sanctioned right to hold such captive audience meetings, to prevent the union 
from holding them, to forbid the asking of questions at such meetings, and to discharge employees who 
ask 'loaded questions' is a manifestation of coercive power and domination.”); see also Craig Becker, 
Democracy in the Workplace: Union Representation Elections and Federal Labor Law, 77 MINN. L. 
REV. 495, 559 (1993) (“Although the Board ratified captive audience speeches on account of the free 
speech proviso, such conduct involves an element of coercion easily distinguishable from expression. 
The captive audience speech is diametrically opposed to the ‘free and open discussion’ the Board pro-
fesses to promote.”). 
 65 This is especially surprising because in Peerless Plywood, a mere five years after Babcock & 
Wilcox, the Board specifically recognized that a restriction on captive audience meetings before an 
election is “a rule of conduct,” not a rule concerning speech.  See Peerless Plywood Co., 107 N.L.R.B. 
427, 429 (1953); see also Livingston Shirt Corp., 107 N.L.R.B. 400, 408 (1953) (“The rule laid down in 
Peerless Plywood is a rule of conduct governing Board elections and, in our opinion, constitutes a 
narrow and reasonable limitation designed to facilitate the holding of free elections in the atmosphere of 
relative tranquility conducive to a sober choice of representative.”) (emphasis added). 
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itself is not coercive (as far as containing an explicit threat or promise), the 
speech was deemed protected under Section 8(c).66 
As far as the phantom “legislative history” to which Babcock & Wilcox 
refers in deciding that Taft-Hartley permits captive audience meetings, one 
can make the educated guess that the Board was obliquely referring to 
statements made in the Senate Report during the Congressional debates 
over Taft-Hartley.  Apparently, some legislators believed that Clark Bros. 
inappropriately “restricted” or “limited” the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Thomas v. Collins,67 which held, among other things, that employers had 
the same speech rights as unions to talk about labor issues.68  Additionally, 
although the Senate Report on the Taft-Hartley Act specifically disapproved 
of Clark Bros., it only stated that the case stood for the proposition that 
employer speech was unlawful merely because it took place “in the plant on 
working time.”69  It appears, though, that the majority in Clark Bros. an-
swered those same concerns when it responded to an argument by the dis-
senting Board Member in Babcock & Wilcox: “We simply do not share his 
view that there is anything in the reasoning or language of the recent     
Supreme Court and Circuit Court decisions he cites [including Thomas v. 
Collins] which requires the Board to treat this particular respondent as 
though it had done no more than make an appeal to the reasoning faculties 
                                                                                                                           
 66 See Babcock & Wilcox, 77 N.L.R.B. 577, 578 (1948). 
 67 323 U.S. 516 (1945).  See Story, supra note 64, at 378 n.113 (citing 1 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF 
THE LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACT 1947, at 429 (1947)) (“By 1947, the drafters of the section 
8(c) amendment were upset with only one important practical doctrinal point: the NLRB’s view, as 
expressed in Clark Bros., 70 N.L.R.B. 60 (1946), that employer captive audience speeches were inher-
ently coercive. In the Senate Report on s 1126 (the original ‘Taft’ amendment), the Senate complained 
that the Board’s decision in Clark Bros. had placed a ‘limited’ and ‘too restrictive’ construction on the 
Supreme Court’s holding in Thomas v. Collins.”).  Yet, Thomas v. Collins itself makes clear that First 
Amendment rights do not also include the ability of the speaker to compel another person to listen, 
Thomas, 323 U.S. 516, 537-38 (1945), so it is unclear what the Senate report means when mentioning 
Clark Bros. and Thomas v. Collins in the same part of the legislative history.  See also CLYDE SUMMERS 
& HARRY WELLINGTON, CASES ON LABOR LAW 265 (1968) (“The Senate Report, in half a sentence 
indicated an intent to overrule Clark Bros., but gave no explanation.”). 
 68 Thomas, 323 U.S. at 518.  Thomas, a closely divided 5-4 decision, concerned the State of 
Texas’ holding in contempt a labor organizer for soliciting for union membership in a public speech 
without first registering with the state and obtaining an “organizer’s card.”  The Court struck down the 
organizer card statute on First Amendment grounds, holding that although, “the State has power to 
regulate labor unions with a view to protecting the public interest . . . Such regulation however,   wheth-
er aimed at fraud or other abuses, must not trespass upon the domain set apart for free speech and free 
assembly.”  Id. at 532. 
 69 See S. REP. NO. 105, Legislative History of the Labor-Management Relations Act of 1947, at 
23.  Although one management-side witness called for “[e]xpress repudiation” of the captive audience 
doctrine, see Labor Relations Program: Hearings on S. 55 Before the Comm. on Labor and Public 
Welfare, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 4, 2139 (1947) (statement of Earl Carroll, Earl Carroll Theater-
Restaurant), such express repudiation is clearly absent from Section 8(c) and any part of the Taft-Hartley 
Amendments. 
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of its employees.”70  In other words, the Clark Bros. majority was respond-
ing to the coercive aspects of the captive audience meetings, not its speech 
elements.   
Additionally, and contrary to concerns expressed in the Senate Report 
to Taft-Hartley, the Thomas Court majority and concurrence could not have 
been clearer about the limits of employer free speech.  Justice Rutledge for 
the majority stated with regard to the right to persuade by speech: “When to 
this persuasion other things are added which bring about coercion, or give it 
that character, the limit of the [employer’s First Amendment] right has been 
passed.”71  Justice Douglas concurred, stating: “[O]nce [a person] uses the 
economic power which he has over other men and their jobs to influence 
their action, he is doing more than exercising the freedom of speech pro-
tected by the First Amendment. That is true whether he be an employer or 
an employee.”72 
Of course, it goes without saying that there is a complete absence in 
the text of Section 8(c) itself of any language that could be read to mandate 
that the Board post-Taft Hartley overturn Clark Bros.73  Indeed, to the extent 
that the language of Section 8(c) is unambiguous in protecting employer 
speech in the labor context, canons of construction would suggest that it is 
inappropriate to look for further meaning from the statute in legislative pro-
nouncements.  In this regard, Justice Scalia has maintained: “We have    
repeatedly held that such reliance on [legislative history] is impermissible 
where, as here, the statutory language is unambiguous.”74  On the other 
hand, to the extent that the language of Section 8(c) could be deemed    
ambiguous, other contemporaneous legislative debates cast significant 
doubt on whether Section 8(c) was ever supposed to address the permissi-
bility of captive audience meetings.75  In short, conclusory assertions aside 
concerning inapplicable provisions and mysterious legislative history, the 
                                                                                                                           
 70 Clark Bros., 70 N.L.R.B. 802, 806 (1946). 
 71 Id. at 537-38. 
 72 Id. at 543-44 (Douglas, J., concurring). 
 73 Some have argued that a combination of timing, text, and legislative history make clear that 
Taft-Hartley was meant to overturn the Clark Bros. doctrine.  The text of Section 8(c) and the legislative 
history of Taft-Hartley do no such thing as explained above.  As for the “timing,” Taft-Hartley amended 
the NLRA in a multitude of ways, Section 8(c) being just one aspect.  So the fact that Babcock & Wilcox 
comes one year after Taft-Hartley’s enactment is in and of itself inconclusive at best.  
 74 Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 665 (2006) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 75 See Story, supra note 64, at 379 (“[A]lthough the House and Senate debates over section 8(c) 
were heated, its supporters provided no further arguments regarding why employers should have free 
speech rights beyond those mentioned by the Supreme Court.”). 
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Board appears to have remained free to uphold Clark Bros. even after the 
enactment of Section 8(c).76     
Interestingly, though the Board missed the opportunity to discuss the 
speech/conduct distinction in captive audience meetings in its Babcock & 
Wilcox decision, the Trial Examiner did not.  He recognized such a distinc-
tion when he held that the captive audience meetings did violate Section 
8(1): 
Standing individually, [the employer’s] statements in his speeches to 
the employees . . . , though openly anti-Union, contain no language 
that on the surface exceeds the bounds of free speech.  If they consti-
tute a violation of the Act, it is because coercion is to be imputed to 
them from the circumstances under which they were uttered and 
which affect their meaning.77  
Although Section 8(c) had not yet been enacted at the time of the Trial 
Examiner’s decision in Babcock & Wilcox,78 he still found that the speech 
utilized by the employer during these meetings was lawful.79  Rather, he 
based his decision of illegality on the coercive nature of the mandatory 
meeting, holding that the employer exploited its ability to control           
employees during working hours by stressing its superior economic posi-
tion.80  But as already discussed, instead of adopting these findings, the 
                                                                                                                           
 76 Alternatively, the Board could have also deemed captive audience meetings a per se violation 
of the necessary “laboratory conditions” as grounds to set the election aside under General Shoe.  See 
infra notes 78-81 and accompanying text. 
 77 Babcock & Wilcox, 77 N.L.R.B. 577, 595 (1948). 
 78 The Trial Examiner’s decision was issued on June 2, 1947; the Taft-Hartley Amendments were 
passed on June 23, 1947.  Of course, the Trial Examiner may well have known of the pending legislation 
as the bill had been debated for months and already vetoed by President Truman. 
 79 Babcock & Wilcox, 77 N.L.R.B at 595. 
 80 Id. at 578 (“With respect to the ‘compulsory audience’ aspect of the speeches, the Trial Exam-
iner concluded from all the evidence that the notices of the meetings as well as the oral instructions 
given to the employees concerning these meetings removed the element of choice from the employees 
and, in effect, compelled them to attend in violation of the Act.”).  The Trial Examiner, unlike the Board, 
recognized that employers, unlike unions, have the ability to exercise immediate and direct economic 
control over their employees.  See Story, supra note 64, at 380  (“To equate heavy-handed union tactics 
of pressuring an employee to sign a union card with the range of tactics available to employers (e.g. 
firing, suspension, failure to promote, favoritism in work assignments, and so on) or to equate the ‘rough 
and tumble’ of some union halls and a union shop contract with hierarchical workplace relationships is 
to operate from a truly impoverished understanding of employer coercion and a false assumption that 
unions and employer are equivalent.”).  Additionally, employers under the labor law have the advantage 
of direct contact with employees while they are at work.  Unions, on the other hand, generally lack 
access to employees on the employer’s property and are relegated to means of communication outside of 
work.  See Lechmere Inc. v. NLRB, 502 U.S. 527, 538 (1992); NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 351 
U.S. 105, 111 (1956); see also Benjamin I. Sachs, Enabling Employee Choice: A Structural Approach to 
the Rules of Union Organizing, 123 HARV. L. REV. 655, 664 (2010) (observing that during the organiz-
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Board, without reasoned elaboration, held the employer’s actions within the 
protections of Section 8(c) and lawful under the Act.81 
Today, employer captive audience meetings are still lawful based on 
this threadbare precedent.  The Board has only revisited the legality of    
employer captive audience meetings on a few occasions, and on each of 
those occasions, the Board has either reiterated the conclusory Babcock & 
Wilcox reasoning82 or further limited the actions of employees with regard 
to such meetings.83  The only limit that actually exists, and it applies both to 
employers and unions, is that parties are prohibited from making captive 
meeting speeches to massed groups of employees within twenty-four hours 
before an election.84  Violations are not deemed unfair labor practices, how-
ever, but rather violations of the Board’s General Shoe laboratory condition 
standard.  
Under General Shoe Corp.,85 the Board set up a test for employer con-
duct that interfered with employees’ ability to decide freely whether to join 
a union: 
In election proceedings, it is the Board’s function to provide a labora-
tory in which an experiment may be conducted, under conditions as 
nearly ideal as possible, to determine the uninhibited desires of the 
employees.  It is our duty to establish those conditions; it is also our 
duty to determine whether they have been fulfilled.  When, in the rare 
extreme case, the standard drops too low, because of our fault or that 
                                                                                                                           
ing phase, union efforts to communicate with employees primarily take place when employees are not at 
work through “house calls”).  
 81 The Board’s failure to provide meaningful analysis of its decision may be explained by intense 
pressure the Board may have felt from Congress and the corporate community to broadly interpret the 
recently enacted employer free speech provision of Section 8(c).  See Alan Story, Employer Speech, 
Union Representation Elections, and the First Amendment, 16 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 356, 358 
(1995) (“[B]y the middle 1940s, Congress faced strong pressures from America's corporate elite to enact 
statutory changes to the NLRA that would constrain further union growth and assist in the reassertion of 
managerial authority.”). 
 82 For instance, twenty years later in Litton Systems, Inc., 173 N.L.R.B. 1024, 1031 (1968), the 
Board merely reiterated the same conclusory language: “[T]he Board has held as long ago as 1948, that 
such a finding is barred by ‘the language of Section 8(c) of the amended Act and its legislative history.’” 
 83 See F.W. Woolworth Co., 251 N.L.R.B. 1111, 1113 (1980) (permitting employer to exclude pro-
union employees from captive audience meetings).  
 84 Peerless Plywood Co., 107 N.L.R.B. 427, 429 (1953); see also Livingston Shirt Corp., 107 
N.L.R.B. 400, 408 (1953) (“The rule laid down in Peerless Plywood is a rule of conduct governing 
Board elections and, in our opinion, constitutes a narrow and reasonable limitation designed to facili-
tate the holding of free elections in the atmosphere of relative tranquility conducive to a sober choice of 
representative.”). 
 85 77 N.L.R.B. 124 (1948).   
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of others, the requisite laboratory conditions are not present and the 
experiment must be conducted over again.  That is the situation here.86 
So although the Board found that the written and verbal communica-
tions during the organizing campaign in General Shoe did not constitute an 
unfair labor practice, nevertheless, it found the employer’s conduct incon-
sistent with employees being able to freely choose whether to join a union 
and ordered that the election be rerun.87   
Thus, seventy-five years after Congress enacted the NLRA, few limi-
tations currently exist on the ability of employers to force their employees 
into captive audience meetings at pain of being terminated for not          
acquiescing.  Although Section 8(c) clearly provides for employer free 
speech, an explanation has not been forthcoming from the Board as to how 
compelling employees to listen to their employers views on unionism is 
part of an    employer’s free speech rights.   
In the next Section, this Article reexamines the policies that led to the 
enactment of the Taft-Hartley Amendments in 1947 and considers whether 
those policies can peacefully coexist with the idea of compelling employees 
to attend employer captive audience meetings and listen to anti-union 
speech. 
III.   EMPLOYEE FREE CHOICE: 
       THE ANIMATING POLICY OF TAFT-HARTLEY 
A. The Policy of the Wagner Act of 1935  
Even prior to the enactment of Taft-Hartley in 1974, the concept of 
employee free choice was central to the labor relations scheme under the 
Wagner Act.  As discussed in the previous section, Congress passed the 
NLRA in 1935 to grant workers the affirmative right to organize, to       
collectively bargain through a representative of their own choosing, and to 
engage in protected activities for mutual aid and protection.88  Enacted in 
the wake of the Great Depression and increased labor unrest, the NLRA 
declared it the national policy of the United States to encourage the practice 
and procedure of collective bargaining by funneling destructive labor dis-
putes into a constructive collective bargaining process.89    
                                                                                                                           
 86 Id. at 127. 
 87 Id. 
 88 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2006). 
 89 See NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 45 (1937) (“The theory of the Act is 
that free opportunity for negotiation with accredited representatives of employees is likely to promote 
industrial peace and may bring about the adjustments and agreements which the Act itself does not to 
compel.”). 
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The Wagner Act recognized the inherent power imbalance between 
employees and their employers because of the former’s economic reliance 
on the latter and sought to employ collective power to offset this            
imbalance.90  Part of the solution to this workplace problem was to provide    
workers “industrial democracy;”91 that is, to give workers some say, some 
input, about the terms and conditions of their employment.92  The legislative 
history of the Act highlights this concept by likening industry with govern-
ment, and labor organizations with political representation.93  
Although the Wagner Act provided a detailed scheme that outlined the 
process of resolving industrial relation disputes, the Act made no reference 
to employer involvement in the selection process when employees deter-
mined whether they would select or designate a bargaining representative.94  
Rather, employer involvement was only addressed after employees had 
selected a bargaining representative of their own choosing; employers were 
to remain neutral while employees exercised their democratic rights.95 The 
policy judgment to exclude employers from the employee selection of a 
bargaining representative was the consequence of various anti-union tactics 
used by employers prior to the 1930s, including the use of strikebreakers 
and Pinkerton agents, the utilization of threats to shut down plant operations 
if the employees unionized, and, of course, the use of workplace captive   
audience meetings.96  As discussed in Part I, the early Board viewed such 
meetings as coercive and as inconsistent with employee free choice. 
                                                                                                                           
 90 Id. at 23 (“The inequality of bargaining power between employees who do not possess full 
freedom of association or actual liberty of contract, and employers who are organized in the corporate 
other forms of ownership association substantially burdens and affects the flow of commerce, and tends 
to aggravate recurrent business depressions, by depressing wage rates and the purchasing power of wage 
earners in industry and by preventing the stabilization of competitive wage rates and working conditions 
within and between industries.”). 
 91 During Senate Hearings debating the NLRA, Senator Wagner, the chief architect of the legisla-
tion, proclaimed “[t]hat is just the very purpose of this legislation, to provide industrial democracy.”  
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD: HEARINGS ON S. 1958 BEFORE THE SENATE COMM. ON 
EDUCATION AND LABOR, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 642 (1935). 
 92 See Cynthia Estlund, Who Mops the Floors in the Fortune 500? Corporate Self-Regulation and 
the Low-Wage Workplace, 12 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 671, 677 (2008) (“In 1935, the National Labor 
Relations Act gave workers the freedom to speak up, make common cause, and form organizations to 
bargain collectively with employers.”). 
 93 “A worker in the field of industry, like a citizen in the field of government, ought to be free to 
form or join organizations, to designate representatives, and to engage in concerted activities.”  S. REP. 
NO. 1184, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1934). 
 94 This omission was by no means incidental, as an employer free speech provision was rejected 
during House debates “as having no place in this bill.”  H.R. REP. NO. 1371, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 6 
(1935). 
 95 See Pa. Greyhound Lines, 1 N.L.R.B. 1, 51 (1935). 
 96 See Story, supra note 64, at 369-70 (discussing the LaFollette Senate Committee’s “sensational 
revelations of employer violations of workers’ civil liberties” during anti-organization campaigns). 
2010] The Contemporary “Fist Inside the Velvet Glove” 401 
 
The Wagner Act also sought to promote employee free choice through 
Section 8(2),97 which prohibited employers from forming “company      
unions.”98  Prevalent throughout the first part of the 20th century,99         
employers often formed these types of union to deter employees from join-
ing independent, outside labor organizations.100  Prohibited by Section 
8(a)(2), the Board came to observe that, “Congress brought within its defi-
nition of ‘labor organization’ a broad range of employee groups, and it 
sought to ensure that such groups were free to act independently of        
employers in representing employee interests.”101  In short, the existence of 
company unions was inconsistent with the promotion of employee free 
choice. 
B. Explicit Preference for Employee Free Choice Under Taft-Hartley 
Whereas the concept of employee free choice was always consistent 
with the core principles of the Wagner Act, it became one of the central 
themes after Congress amended the NLRA through the Taft-Hartley Act in 
1947.102  Although the Taft-Hartley Act made important changes to the 
NLRA, it did so through addition, leaving the policy of the NLRA and most 
of its text unchanged.103  The Amendments were the product of a Congres-
sional policy in favor of employee free choice,104 a sentiment that the    
Wagner Act unfairly favored union interests,105 and the belief that employer 
                                                                                                                           
 97 “It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer to dominate or interfere with the formation 
or administration of any labor organization or contribute financial or other support to it.”  29 U.S.C. § 
158(a)(2) (2006). 
 98 See Mark Barenberg, Democracy and Domination in the Law of Workplace Cooperation: From 
Bureaucratic to Flexible Production, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 753, 776-77 (1994) (stating that proponents of 
the NLRA sought to promote employee free choice by eliminating company unions). 
 99 See Matthew W. Finkin, Section III: Commercial Labor Law: Representation of Employees 
Within the Firm: The United States Report, 54 AM. J. COMP. L. 395, 403 (Supp. 2006) (maintaining 
intent of Section 8(a)(2) was to eliminate company unions). 
 100 See Barenberg, supra note 98, at 772, 780 (“The company union was  . . . an apparatus that 
tended to produce a cadre of workers opposed to outside unionism because especially beholden to, or 
intimidated by, management’s preferred mode of governance.”). 
 101 Electromation, Inc., 309 N.L.R.B. 990, 994 (1992). 
 102 Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act, Pub. L. No. 80-101, 61 Stat. 136 (1947).   
 103 See Harry Mills & Emily Brown, FROM THE WAGNER ACT TO TAFT-HARTLEY: A STUDY OF 
NATIONAL LABOR POLICY AND LABOR RELATIONS 630 (1950) (“Much of the body of doctrine built up 
during the twelve years of the Wagner Act was left untouched by the [Taft-Hartley] amendments.”). 
 104 See Cynthia L. Estlund, The Ossification of American Labor Law, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 1527, 
1534 (2002) (“Taft-Hartley turned away from the forthright endorsement of collective bargaining and 
reframed the basic policy of the Act as favoring employee ‘free choice’ with respect to unionization and 
collective bargaining.”). 
 105 See Paul Alan Levy, The Unidimensional Perspective of the Reagan Labor Board, 16 RUTGERS 
L.J. 269, 274 (1985) (“[T]he claim of one-sidedness on the part of the Board prompted Congress in 1947 
to enact a law designed to equalize the relationship between corporations and union.”).   
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speech should be protected during an organizational campaign.  In this   
latter regard, the Senate report accompanying the Taft-Hartley Act states 
that “this amendment . . . would insure both to employers and labor organi-
zations full freedom to express their views to employees on labor matters, 
refrain from threats of violence, intimidation of economic reprisal, or offers 
of benefit.”106      
Both the U.S. Supreme Court107 and the Board108 have repeatedly    
emphasized the NLRA’s policy in favor of employee free choice in        
numerous contexts.  Most recently, the Court examined the importance of        
employee free choice under the NLRA in Chamber of Commerce v. 
Brown.109  In Brown, the Court addressed whether a California statute that 
prohibited employers who receive state funds from using those funds to 
promote or deter organization was preempted by the NLRA.110  In the pro-
cess of holding that the California law was preempted by the NLRA,111   
Justice Stevens, for the Court majority, reaffirmed that the Taft-Hartley Act 
demonstrated Congressional intent to permit representation elections where 
                                                                                                                           
 106 S. REP. NO. 105, S. 1126 (1947). 
 107 See, e.g., Auciello Iron Works v. NLRB, 517 U.S. 781, 790 (1996) (discussing the NLRA’s 
“command to respect the free choice of employees” to select bargaining representatives); NLRB v. 
Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 608 (1969) (discussing the Board’s obligation to ensure employee 
free choice in the use of authorization cards); NLRB v. Exch. Parts Co., 375 U.S. 405, 409 (1964) (hold-
ing that Section 8(a)(1) prohibits employer conduct that inhibits employees’ freedom of choice); Gar-
ment Workers’ v. NLRB, 366 U.S. 731, 737 (1961) (“[T]he Wagner Act guarantees employees’ freedom 
of choice and majority rule.”); Brooks v. NLRB, 348 U.S. 96, 99 (1954) (observing that by conducting 
secret ballot elections to determine union representation, Board ensures employee free choice).  
 108 See, e.g., Dana Corp., 351 N.L.R.B. 434, 441 (2007) (“[Employee] free choice is, after all, the 
fundamental value protected by the Act.”); Madison Square Garden Ct., LLC., 350 N.L.R.B. 117, 121 
(2007) (setting aside the representation election because a supervisor’s conduct coerced and interfered 
with employee free choice); Seattle Mariners, 335 N.L.R.B. 563, 565 (2001) (“[B]y dismissing the 
instant petition, we are both promoting voluntary recognition and effectuating the free choice of the 
majority of the unit employees.”); Smith’s Food & Drug Ctrs., 320 N.L.R.B. 844, 846 (1996) (holding 
that its rule requiring a challenging union to demonstrate a thirty percent showing of interest before a 
decertification petition will be granted effectuates employee free choice); Electromation, Inc., 309 
N.L.R.B. 990, 993 (1992) (discussing the Wagner Act’s ban on employer dominated labor organizations 
as furthering Congress’ goal of promoting employee free choice when selecting a labor organization); 
Midland Nat’l Life Ins. Co., 263 N.L.R.B. 127, 133 (1982) (holding that deceptive statements that 
interferes with employee free choice will be grounds to set an election aside); RCA Del Caribe, 262 
N.L.R.B. 963, 965 (1982) (“This new approach [to representation petitions filed by challenging unions] 
affords maximum protection to the complementary statutory policies of furthering stability in industrial 
relations and of insuring employee free choice); Peerless Plywood, 107 N.L.R.B. 427, 429 (1953) (“We 
institute this rule pursuant to our statutory authority and obligation to conduct elections in circumstances 
and under conditions which will insure employees a free and untrammeled choice.”). 
 109 554 U.S. 60 (2008). 
 110 Id. at 62. 
 111 Id. at 65-66. 
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employees can exercise free choice in deciding whether to be represented 
by a union.112 
The NLRA’s policy in favor of employee free choice has also been 
lately demonstrated by the proposed Employee Free Choice Act (EFCA).113  
The bill, not coincidentally named after this preeminent policy of the Act, 
seeks to promote employee free choice, most notably by allowing unions to 
gain recognition via a “card check” majority.  Although the bill has thus far 
failed to pass Congress, the delay is not the result of sentiment opposed to 
employee free choice; rather, the debate continues as to how best to ensure 
employee free choice.114  While Democrats generally support EFCA’s card 
check recognition provision, most Republicans oppose such a recognition 
procedure, instead demanding that the Board maintain its secret ballot elec-
tion procedure, which they believe best furthers employee free choice when 
choosing for or against designating a bargaining representative.115   
In short, little doubt exists that any interpretation of the NLRA should 
be consistent with one of its central animating principles: ensuring         
employee free choice concerning the decision of whether to join a labor 
union.  The next Part contends that only a per se rule prohibiting employer 
captive audience meetings is consistent with conducting “elections in cir-
cumstances and under conditions which will ensure employees a free and 
untrammeled choice.”116 
 
                                                                                                                           
 112 Id. at 74 (“The NLRB has policed a narrow zone of speech to ensure free and fair elections 
under the aegis of § 9 of the NLRA.”). 
 113 Employee Free Choice Act of 2009, S. 560, 111th Cong. (2009), available at 
http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=s111-560 (“A bill to amend the National Labor Relations 
Act to establish an efficient system to enable employees to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to 
provide for mandatory injunctions for unfair labor practices during the organizing efforts, and for other 
purposes.”). 
 114 See Drummonds, supra note 15, at 97 (“Management-side lawyers often argue that the law 
works to allow employees to exercise their free choice rights,” while union lawyers and most scholars 
disagree with this assessment). 
 115 See Arlen Specter & Eric S. Nguyen, Representation Without Intimidation: Securing Workers’ 
Right to Choose Under the National Labor Relations Act, 45 HARV. J. LEGIS. 311, 318 (2008) (“Recent 
efforts to address the shortcomings in the NLRA have gone nowhere. On one side of the aisle, Demo-
crats have supported legislation that would mandate union recognition based on authorization cards, or a 
‘card check’ procedure.  On the other side, Republicans have blocked consideration of that legislation 
and have instead supported legislation that mandates secret ballot elections in all circumstances.”). 
 116 Peerless Plywood, 107 N.L.R.B. 427, 429 (1953). 
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IV.   THE NLRA FRAMEWORK SUPPORTS A PER SE BAN 
ON CAPTIVE AUDIENCE MEETINGS 
AND CURRENT BOARD PRECEDENT IS NOT AN OBSTACLE 
A. The Time Has Come to Reinstitute the Clark Bros. Doctrine  
In light of the NLRA’s explicit and fundamental policy of favoring 
employee free choice in the union organizational setting, the Board should 
adopt a per se ban on employer captive audience meetings.  Such meetings 
significantly interfere with employees’ rights to decide whether to join, or 
refrain from joining, a labor organization under Section 7 of the Act and 
are, therefore, an unfair labor practice in violation of Section 8(a)(1).   
Not only would such a legal conclusion be consistent with the policy 
of employee free choice, but such an approach would be entirely supported 
by both U.S. Supreme Court precedent in the labor picketing context under 
the Vogt line of cases,117 and with the surrounding legislative history of the 
Wagner Act and the Taft-Hartley Amendments.  The relevant case law    
recognizes the duality of labor speech activities and permits the government 
to regulate the conduct aspects of such activities.  Although there is some 
language in the Senate report disapproving of the Clark Bros. doctrine,118 
these meager excerpts reflect at most Congressional concern in some quar-
ters about the doctrine.  By no means, however, do these statements provide 
a sufficient basis for concluding, in derogation of the statute’s clear         
language, that Congress intended to permit captive audience meetings    
pursuant to Section 8(c).    
Instead, the text of Section 8(c) is the clearest indication that Congress 
decided not to make a legislative statement one way or the other on the 
permissibility of captive audience speech.  That inaction leaves it for the 
Board to decide, based on its experience with the complexities surrounding 
industrial relations, which path to take.119  Because employer captive audi-
ence meetings are not about free speech, but conduct, the Board is free to 
                                                                                                                           
 117 Recall that the Vogt analysis permits regulation of coercive union conduct on the picket line.  I 
argue here that Vogt strongly suggests that the Board, consistent with the free speech provisions of 
Section 8(c), be able to regulate coercive employer captive audience conduct.  In other words, the Bab-
cock & Wilcox Board failed to appreciate that the coercive aspect of captive audience meetings often 
comes not from employer’s explicit speech, but from the context in which the employer speech is deliv-
ered.  See NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 617 (1969); NLRB v. Exch. Parts Co., 375 U.S. 
405, 409 (1964). 
 118 See supra notes 67-76 and accompanying text. 
 119 See Paul M. Secunda, Politics Not As Usual: Inherently Destructive Conduct, Institutional 
Collegiality, and the National Labor Relations Board, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 51, 56 (2004) (“By placing 
the enforcement mechanism of the Act within the NLRB, Congress expected that experienced officials 
with an adequate appreciation of the complexities surrounding industrial relations would make the 
decisions that would shape national labor policy.”). 
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take action in this area without impermissibly burdening any constitutional 
rights of employers.  With its focus on conduct, a rule banning employers 
from compelling attendance at these meetings would qualify as a regulation 
of conduct rather than as an impermissible content-based regulation on 
speech.120  Further, and significantly, the U.S. Supreme Court has long rec-
ognized that government may protect a listener’s interest in avoiding     
unwanted communication.121   
On the other hand, even if a court were to side with employers and 
their allies and construe captive audience meetings as involving employer 
speech rights, restrictions placed on such meetings by the Board would be 
permissible under the First Amendment and Section 8(c) as “time, place and 
manner” regulations,122 would be appropriately content neutral,123 and would 
be valid under the Supreme Court’s captive audience doctrine as applied 
outside the parameters of the NLRA.124  Further, any concerns that a per se 
ban on employer captive audience meetings would unduly restrict employer 
speech would be further quelled by the fact that employers would still be 
free to make the exact same speeches to employees.125  A ban on captive 
audience speeches would not do anything to restrict employer speeches that 
are otherwise protected by Section 8(c); the only resulting difference is that 
such speeches can only be given to employees who, consistent with the 
                                                                                                                           
 120 Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476, 487 (1993) (holding that a hate crimes statute did not 
violate free speech rights because “the statute . . . is aimed at conduct unprotected by the First Amend-
ment”). 
 121 Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 734 (2000); Rowan v. U.S. Post Office Dep’t, 397 U.S. 728, 
738 (1970) (“[N]o one has a right to press even ‘good’ ideas on an unwilling recipient.”); Thomas v. 
Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 537-38 (1945) (finding that employers may have right to persuade their employ-
ees, but “[w]hen to this persuasion other things are added which bring about coercion, or give it that 
character, the limit of the [employer’s First Amendment] right has been passed”). 
 122 Clark v. C.C.N.V., 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984).   
 123 Turner v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 649 (1994); Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 
(1989).  Such an interpretive approach does not single out meetings concerning unionization.  It would 
cover all matters of personal conscience and belief:  religion, political campaigns, and unionization.  All 
of these concerns can involve highly charged and complex issues of personal preference and trust.  The 
Board should be permitted to adopt this interpretation of current NLRA law to address the perception 
that it is unfair to require employees to listen to their employers' views about subjects laden with ideo-
logical content. 
 124 Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 487 (1988) (“The First Amendment permits the government to 
prohibit offensive speech as intrusive when the ‘captive’ audience cannot avoid the objectionable 
speech.”); Lehman v. Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298, 307 (1974) (Douglas, J., concurring); Erznoznik v. 
City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 209 (1975); Rowan, 397 U.S. at 737. 
 125 During the presentation of this paper at the Florida International Law Review Symposium, one 
detractor of this proposal suggested that employers would not have adequate means to address their 
employees about unions without the ability to hold captive audience meetings.  One person in the audi-
ence responded to this concern aptly: Isn’t it just as easy to get employees to come to voluntary meet-
ings on unionism if you offer them food or some other benefit for attending?  Indeed, the only        
employees who probably won’t attend are those who are firmly in support of unionization. 
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policy of the Act, voluntarily choose to hear the speech.126  The combination 
of voluntary exchanges between employer and employee, both inside and 
outside the workplace, will still lead to an informed electorate before the 
representation election occurs.   
So, not only do such meetings interfere with the laboratory conditions 
needed for a fair and free representation election, but more fundamentally, 
such meetings bring the full economic power and intimidation of employers 
to bear on employees who are told in no uncertain terms that joining a    
union would be bad for them and the company.  As such, employer captive 
audience meetings should be seen as employer conduct that interferes with 
the employee right to choose whether to join a union.   
B. The Non-Immutable Nature of NLRB Precedent 
Now, it may be argued by opponents that such a change in Board      
direction would overrule more than sixty years of Board precedent.  That is 
correct.  Such a ban of captive audience meetings would necessarily require 
the Board to overturn its 1948 Babcock & Wilcox decision.  But Board 
precedent here should not be an obstacle to the NLRB.  
Although I believe strongly in a substantial role for Board precedent 
(the Board’s history of flip-flopping in various doctrinal areas notwithstand-
ing),127 I also strongly believe that old Board cases should only be given 
precedential effect to the extent that they deserve to be given such effect.  
Board precedent is not sacrosanct, especially where the initial Board       
decision is not supported by a modicum of reasoned elaboration.  Recall 
that in Babcock & Wilcox, the Board failed to elaborate on its reasoning for 
its new rule,128 simply stating that “the language of Section 8(c) of the 
                                                                                                                           
 126 Indeed, one form of the captive audience meeting, supervisor speech to individual employees, 
has been found by the Board to be capable of leading to a General Shoe laboratory conditions test viola-
tion in the pro-union supervisor context.  See Harborside Health Care, Inc., 343 N.L.R.B. 906 (2004).  In 
Harborside, although the Board made clear that supervisor pro-union speech is not objectionable in and 
of itself, id. at 911, the 3-2 Republican majority reaffirmed “long-standing Board precedent” that pro-
union supervisory conduct may be grounds for setting aside an election without there being an explicit 
threat of reprisal or promise of benefit.  Id. at 909.  More specifically, the Board adopted a rule that 
supervisory solicitation of union authorization cards is inherently coercive absent mitigating circum-
stances.  It would appear to make sense, then, to treat anti-union supervisor speech as coercive conduct 
as well when supervisors use their workplace authority to keep employees from either signing a union 
authorization card or voting against the union in an election.  Moreover, it would seem evident that 
instances of supervisor pro-union intimidation in this context would pale in comparison to normal anti-
union intimidation by supervisors. 
 127 See Dana Corp., 351 N.L.R.B. 434, 441 (2007) (“Even in the context of administrative law, the 
principle of stare decisis is entitled to considerable weight.”). 
 128 Indeed, the Babcock & Wilcox Board dedicated only half a sentence to overturning its Clark 
Bros. doctrine while establishing that captive audience meetings are protected under Section 8(c). 
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amended Act [Taft-Hartley], and its legislative history, make it clear that the 
doctrine of the Clark Bros. case no longer exists as a basis for finding an 
unfair labor practices [based on captive audience meetings].”129  However, 
the Board’s rationale that its decision was based on the legislative history of 
the Taft-Hartley Act was illusory; and the Board failed to cite to any    
committee reports or Congressional debates discussing the Act.  Nor did the 
decision acknowledge that the policy of the Taft-Hartley Act was to ensure 
employee free choice.  By narrowly basing its decision on Section 8(c), the 
Babcock & Wilcox Board also failed to recognize the dual speech/conduct 
aspects of captive audience meetings. In short, the Board’s 1948 decision in 
Babcock & Wilcox does not come close to the type of Board precedent that 
should be respected.  In the absence of any reasoned elaboration as to why 
the promulgation of Section 8(c), an employee free speech provision, or 
legislative history, required the abandonment of the Clark Bros. doctrine 
outlawing captive audience meeting, the only thing to recommend this old 
case is its age and strange persistence.  That alone, however, does not sup-
port continual adherence to it. 
The Board has recently shown its willingness to overturn decades-old 
Board precedent.130 Indeed, the Board articulated standards for overturning 
its own precedent in two cases: IBM Corp.131 and Dana Corp.132  In IBM 
Corp., the Board continued its shifting position regarding non-unionized 
employees’ rights to have a coworker present at a disciplinary investigatory 
interview, conventionally known as “Weingarten rights.”133  Overturning its 
Epilepsy Foundation of Northeast Ohio134 decision, the Board stated that, 
“national labor relations policy will be best served by overruling existing 
                                                                                                                           
 129 See Babcock & Wilcox, 77 N.L.R.B. 577, 578 (1948). 
 130 During the presentation of this paper at the Symposium, Member Schaumber maintained that 
the Board’s recent decision by a 3-2 partisan margin in Dana Corp., 351 N.L.R.B. 434, did not represent 
a radical departure from precedent.  I, and many others, disagree strongly with this sentiment.  How can 
a case that overturns forty years of precedent with a new rule developed out of whole cloth not be con-
sidered anything but a radical departure from prior precedent? 
 131 341 N.L.R.B. 1288 (2004). 
 132 351 N.L.R.B. 434. 
 133 Employee rights to have a representative present during disciplinary investigatory interviews 
were first recognized by U.S. Supreme Court in NLRB v. J. Weingarten, Inc., 420 U.S. 251 (1975).  
There, the Court held that unionized employees have the right to have a union representative present at 
interviews with the employee if that interview might reasonably lead to disciplinary action.  In E.I. 
DuPont & Co., 289 N.L.R.B. 627, 628 (1988), the Board reaffirmed its position that Weingarten rights 
do not apply to nonunionized workers, but acknowledged that such an interpretation of the Act was 
“permissible” rather than “mandatory.”  DuPont was overturned twelve years later in Epilepsy Founda-
tion of Northeast Ohio, 331 N.L.R.B. 676, 678 (2000), when the Board this time decided that the Act 
guaranteed all employees, whether unionized or not, the protections of Weingarten. 
 134 331 N.L.R.B. 676 (2000). 
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precedent and returning to the earlier precedent of DuPont.”135  The Board 
noted that when it is faced with two permissible interpretations of the Act 
(that of DuPont or Epilepsy Foundation), it is free to use its discretion to 
decide which rule best effectuates the Act’s overarching goals.136  Consistent 
with its duties to “adapt the Act to the changing patterns of industrial life”137 
and to further the policies of the Act, the Board felt compelled to overturn 
Epilepsy Foundation and adopt the new rule in IBM.138 
Similarly, the Board should feel compelled to overturn Babcock & 
Wilcox and embrace a new rule consistent with the Clark Bros. doctrine.  
Such a switch in the context of captive audience meetings would both “best 
serve national labor relations policy,” and “adapt the Act to the changing 
patterns of industrial life.”  Because we now know after sixty years of     
experience that captive audience meetings have become a ubiquitous and 
effective tactic in contemporary anti-organizing campaigns,139 the per se ban 
would be consistent with the changing patterns of industrial life and also 
best serve the main national labor relations policy, which all agree is to 
promote employee free choice in deciding whether or not to be represented 
by a union.    
The more recent case of Dana Corp.140 stands even more strongly for 
the proposition that Board precedent should not stand in the way just     
because of its old date.  In Dana Corp., the Board overturned more than 
forty years of Board precedent by modifying its voluntary recognition-bar 
doctrine.141  The longstanding rule had been that an employer’s voluntary 
recognition of a union barred an election petition by employees and rival 
unions for a “reasonable period of time,” usually around six months, to 
promote stability in the newly-formed collective bargaining relationship.142  
The Board stressed that the overturning of past Board precedent was 
necessary “to provide greater protection for employee free choice.”143  By 
                                                                                                                           
 135 IBM, 341 N.L.R.B. at 1289. 
 136 Id. at 1289-90. 
 137 Id. at 1291 (citing Weingarten, 420 U.S. at 266). 
 138 Id. at 1294. 
 139 Indeed, even the Board, in the laboratory conditions context, has recognized the coercive effect 
of captive audience meetings on employee free choice and permitted the formulation of rules of conduct 
to deal with that coercive situation.  See Peerless Plywood Co., 107 N.L.R.B. 427, 429 (1953); see also 
Livingston Shirt Corp., 107 N.L.R.B. 400, 408 (1953) (reading Peerless Plywood as providing a “rule of 
conduct” against last-minute captive audience meetings). 
 140 Dana Corp., 351 N.L.R.B. 434, 437 (2007) (acknowledging that the Board’s previous recogni-
tion-bar doctrine was established in Keller Plastics Eastern, Inc., 157 N.L.R.B. 583 (1966)). 
 141 Id. at 434. 
 142 Id. at 437 (citing Keller Plastics, 157 N.L.R.B. at 587) (“[T]he parties must be afforded a 
reasonable time to bargain and to execute the contracts resulting from such bargaining.”). 
 143 Id. at 438. 
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allowing employees of the bargaining unit to file a decertification petition 
or a certification petition in favor of a rival union under its newly fashioned 
rule within forty-five days of the employer’s voluntary recognition of the 
union, the Board believed it was furthering one of the Act’s central policy 
goals.144  Anticipating concerns stemming from overturning forty years of 
Board precedent in this area, the Board majority concluded that its rules are 
not “fixed and immutable,” and have been changed in other situations to 
impose higher standards.145  Further, the Board stated that its “precedent is 
not immune from reconsideration simply because it is of a certain          
vintage.”146 
Likewise, and consistent with the Board’s reasoning concerning when 
to defer to precedent, the Board should readily overturn its Babcock &    
Wilcox decision and enact a ban on employer captive audience meetings.  
Babcock & Wilcox is simply irreconcilable with the Act’s policy of        
employee free choice.  It is absurd to think that employees, forced to attend 
anti-organizing meetings at the direction of their employer, where they are 
not free to ask questions or challenge the employer’s indoctrination, could 
possibly exercise free choice during the subsequent certification election. 
This is the classic situation of the “fist inside the velvet glove.”147 Moreover, 
as the Dana Corp. Board itself observed, Board rules are not “fixed and 
immutable,”148 but should be changed to protect NLRA values,149 and are 
“not immune from reconsideration simply because [they are] of a certain 
vintage.”150  All of these factors inexorably lead to the conclusion that    
Babcock & Wilcox should be overturned and a new rule based on Clark 
Bros. adopted to insulate employees from coercive employer conduct. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
Based on employee free choice, the conduct/speech distinction, and 
the threadbare nature of NLRB precedent in this area, the Board should 
return to its Clark Bros. doctrine and make employer captive audience 
                                                                                                                           
 144 Id. at 434 (“In order to achieve a ‘finer balance’ of interests that better protects employees’ free 
choice, we herein modify the Board’s recognition-bar doctrine . . . .”). 
 145 Id. at 441.   
 146 Id. at 441 n.32. 
 147 See NLRB v. Exch. Parts Co., 375 U.S. 405, 409 (1964).  Just as employees are “well aware of 
the inference that well timed employer benefits” suggest, employees are equally aware of the meaning 
behind being compelled, at pain of discipline or termination, to hear their employer views of labor 
unions also strong: “[T]hat the source of benefits now conferred is also the source from which future 
benefits must flow and which may dry up if it is not obliged.”  Id. 
 148 See Dana Corp., 351 N.L.R.B. at 441.   
 149 Id. at 434.   
 150 Id. at 441 n.32. 
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meetings a per se violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the NLRA.  No need exists 
for statutory amendment of the NLRA because the current language of the 
Act, even in light of the Section 8(c) employer free speech provisions,   
readily supports this alternative interpretation. Without being compelled to 
listen to their employer’s anti-union screed, employees will better be able to 
exercise their free choice in deciding whether they wish to be represented 
by a labor organization. 
 
